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Abstract A significant amount of research has proposed
that power leads to heuristic and category based informa-
tion processing, however, the evidence is often contradic-
tory. We propose the novel idea that power magnifies
chronically accessible information processing styles which
can contribute to either systematic or heuristic processing.
We examine heuristic (vs. systematic) processing in asso-
ciation with the need for closure. The results of three
studies and a meta-analysis supported these claims. Power
increased heuristic information processing, manifested in
the recognition of schema consistent information, in the use
of stereotypical information to form impressions and
decreased the complexity of categorical representations,
but only for those participants who, by default, processed
information according to simplified heuristics, i.e., are high
in need for closure. For those who prefer this processing
style less, i.e., low in need for closure, power led to the
opposite effects. These findings suggest that power licenses
individuals to rely on their dominant information process-
ing strategies, and that power increases interpersonal
variability.
Keywords Power  Systematic or heuristic processing 
Memory for schema-consistent information  Stereotyping 
Cognitive complexity
Introduction
Research has shown that power affects diverse psycho-
logical phenomena associated with increased reliance on
heuristics (i.e., rules of thumb that can inform judgment,
see Keltner et al. 2003), and category based thinking (Fiske
1993). Power holders are often socially inattentive, they
rely on stereotypes (Fiske 1993; Guinote and Phillips
2010), sexualize others (Bargh et al. 1995), and fail to
adopt another’s perspective (Chen et al. 2009; Galinsky
et al. 2006). It has also been proposed that power licenses
individuals to act at will, and gives them the freedom of
self-expression (Kraus et al. 2011; Overbeck et al. 2006),
such as the tendency to express enduring attitudes (An-
derson and Berdahl 2002) and other chronically accessible
constructs (Chen et al. 2001; Guinote et al. 2012). In the
present article, we expand these findings to the domain of
information processing strategies. We propose that power
magnifies chronically accessible information processing
styles, and that this in turn affects the extent to which
people rely on heuristics. Thus, instead of arguing that
power leads to a committed way of processing information
(e.g., heuristic, systematic), we argue that power licenses
individuals to use their default strategies.
In this paper we focus on the preference for heuristic
(vs. systematic) processing, as these cognitive styles
underlie many social cognitive phenomena (for an over-
view, see: Chaiken and Ledgerwood 2012). We examine
heuristic (vs. systematic) processing in association with the
need for closure, defined as the need to avoid ambiguity by
having an answer on a given topic (Webster and
Kruglanski 1994). High need for closure is manifested in
category-based, nonsystematic and heuristic information
processing style, preference in predictability and quick
decision-making (Driscoll et al. 1991; Kruglanski and
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Webster 1996). By contrast, low need for closure leads to
heuristic processing style less and it is usually manifested
in vigilant behavior that is based on a more systematic and
effortful search for relevant information, its evaluation, and
its unbiased assimilation (for an overview see Roets et al.
2015). Thus we propose that power increased heuristic
information processing, but only for those participants
who, by default, processed information according to sim-
plified heuristics, i.e., are high in need for closure. For
those who preferred to process information less heuristi-
cally, i.e., low in need for closure, power led to the
opposite effects. We expect also that the lack of power may
lead people to less spontaneously apply their typical
information-processing styles.
Power and processing styles
It has been extensively argued that there is a link between
power and increased heuristic processing (i.e., the use of
simplified rules of thumb to form judgments, see Fiske
1993; Keltner et al. 2003). This proposition derives from
the assumption that power holders are cognitive misers,
unmotivated to deploy attention, especially in the social
domain. Consistent with this notion, power holders have
been found to use simplified, category-based information,
such as stereotypes, to make judgments (Fiske,1993; Gui-
note and Phillips 2010). For example, upon reading infor-
mation about social targets who belong to different
ethnicities, individuals with power paid relatively more
attention to information that was consistent with the
national stereotypes of the targets compared to stereotype-
inconsistent information. This was not the case for partic-
ipants in a control or powerless position (Fiske 1993;
Guinote and Phillips 2010). Similarly, compared to pow-
erless individuals, when making social judgments, power
holders relied more on their own vantage point (Chen et al.
2009; Galinsky et al. 2003), and on information that easily
came to mind (e.g., ease-of-retrieval, Weick and Guinote
2008).
In spite of this evidence, a number of studies have
shown that power holders do not always use schematic,
effortless processes to guide their attention, judgments and
actions. For example, Ebenbach and Keltner (1998)
demonstrated that while participants with power tended to
use heuristic, effort-saving strategies when making judg-
ments about the attitudes of an ideological opponent, this
was not the case when they experienced negative emotions
associated with the ideological conflict. Negative emotions
trigger systematic processing (see Schwarz and Clore
2003), and enhanced the accuracy of the judgments. Sim-
ilarly, Overbeck and Park (2001) demonstrated that in
interactions marked with a sense of responsibility, power
enhanced attention and memory for the personal attributes
of the interaction partners. Guinote et al. (2012) proposed a
single mechanism to account for the contradictory response
tendencies found in power holders. They argue that power
increases reliance on accessible constructs and scripts (i.e.,
those that have a low threshold of activation) regardless of
whether they are chronically accessible or temporarily
activated by the states and goals of the power holder or by
the environment.
Past research on the links between power and disposi-
tions focused on trait-like chronically accessible constructs
and scripts stored in memory. In the present article, we
argue that not only trait related aspects of the self but also
information processing styles are capable of being affected
by power. Specifically, we argue that power licenses
individuals to rely on their preferred ways of processing
information (heuristic or systematic). Because people in
powerful positions feel free to act at will and in authentic
ways (Kraus et al. 2011), they do not have the need to
constrain the use of their processing styles. In contrast, the
lack of power may lead people to less spontaneously apply
their typical information-processing styles. This notion is
consistent with the finding that lack of power decreases
self-expression. For example, individuals who lacked
power felt obliged to smile, and smiled in less authentic
ways compared to power holders (Hecht and LaFrance
1998). Similarly, studies focusing on eating behavior found
that the eating behavior of power holders was guided by
their feelings of hunger and how appetizing the food was,
while for powerless individuals there was no relationship
between eating and their feelings of hunger or the attrac-
tiveness of the food (Guinote 2010).
Overview of the study
We expect that along with the freedom from constraints,
the ability to act at will (Overbeck et al. 2006), and
increased confidence (Petty et al. 2007), power holders
may more freely rely on heuristic information processing,
if they typically prefer this information processing style
(i.e., if they are high in the need for closure). However,
they should engage less on this information processing
style if this is not their default mode (i.e., if they are low in
the need for closure). Moreover, as lack of power usually
leads people to less spontaneously rely on their disposi-
tions, they also may be less prone to apply their typical
information-processing style. Thus, in this condition we do
not expect any relationship between need for closure and
processing style.
To test these hypotheses we conducted three studies
focusing on memory for schema-consistent information,
stereotypical impression formation, and the construction of
simple categories as core examples of heuristic processing
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(e.g., Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Fiske and Taylor 1984;
Kruglanski and Mayseless 1988; Schroder et al. 1967; Van
Hiel and Mervielde 2003). We expect that powerful people
who typically process information according to simple
heuristics (high need for closure) will recognize more
schema-related information, use more stereotypical infor-
mation to form impressions about a target group, and create
less complex social categories, compared to those who
prefer to process information in less heuristic and more
systematic way (low need for closure). If our hypotheses
that power magnifies default processing is true, we should
also observe more less heuristic thus more systematic
processing under power among low need for closure par-
ticipants. Crucially, the influence of default processes on
social judgments should be more pronounced for power
holders than for individuals who do not have power.
Study 1
In Study 1 we tested the hypothesis that power amplifies
the links between chronic processing strategies and pref-
erences for schema-consistent information. A preference
for heuristic processing manifests in increased attention
and memory for schema-consistent compared to schema-
inconsistent information (see Fiske and Neuberg 1990).
Importantly, we expected this effect to be especially pro-
nounced among high (vs. low) power participants.
Positive mood boosts default information processing
strategies (Hunsinger et al. 2012), and power has been
associated with positive mood (Keltner et al. 2003). Thus,
to check the possibility that the effects of power derive
from differences in mood, mood was assessed in this study.
Method
Participants
A total of 50 students (36 females and 14 males;
Mage = 16.6, SD 0.84) participated in the study on a vol-
untary basis.1 Two participants failed to complete the
measures, thus their results were excluded from the anal-
yses. Participants were randomly assigned to the powerful
or the powerless conditions.
Materials and procedure
Participants took part in the experiment in small groups. At
the beginning of the session, participants completed the
Need for Closure Scale (Webster and Kruglanski 1994) to
assess their preferred information processing styles
(heuristic vs. systematic). One of the subscale, Decisive-
ness, has been considered as an unreliable measure of
motivation, and was replaced with six items developed by
Roets and van Hiel (2007). Answers were given on six-
point scales, from (1) completely disagree, to (6) com-
pletely agree. From these measures, a single scale was
formed (Cronbach’s a = .81, M = 3.56, SD 0.41). Higher
mean values indicate a higher preference for heuristic
processing.
Subsequently, participants were informed that they
would work on two independent studies. The first study
allegedly investigated the perception of past events. The
second focused on the ways people form impressions of the
personalities of other people. First, power was manipulated
by asking participants to report either a past event in which
they had power over someone, or a past event in which
someone had power over them (Galinsky et al. 2003). The
written report was followed by a manipulation check that
read ‘‘Now we would like to know how much in charge
you were in this situation.’’ Answers were given on a
6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much).
Participants also reported their mood on a single 6-point
scale, from (1) very bad, to (6) very good.
The experimenter, who was unaware of hypotheses or
conditions, then introduced the second, ostensibly unre-
lated, study. To measure preferences for schema-consistent
information we used a classic task (Neuberg and Fiske
1987; Sentis and Burnstein 1979) that asks participants to
form impressions about target people. Participants were
given the written instruction, that informed that they would
be presented with information about two different persons,
whose friendliness had been assessed in a previous study.
To help participants form a hypothesis about the two tar-
gets, one was described as ‘‘very friendly’’ by more than
80 % of the previous participants, and the other was
described as ‘‘very unfriendly’’ by more than 80 % of the
previous participants. Participants were then informed that
they would be presented with a few statements describing
each target. Each item was presented on a separate display
(e.g. ‘‘Tom (friendly): Volunteered to care for lonely old
people.’’). Participants were tasked with assessing the
extent to which each piece of information confirmed the
trait friendly of a given person on a scale from 1 (‘‘Does not
confirm’’) to 6 (‘‘Fully confirms’’). Participants were pre-
sented with 30 sentences (15 per target). Both sets com-
prised five items consistent with the trait, five items
inconsistent with the trait, and five items irrelevant to the
1 For each study, we aimed to collect at least 45 participants, based
on a priori power analysis with medium effect size (f = 0.25) and
power at .80. We did not conduct any statistical analyses before we
finished collecting the data.
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trait. An example of a friendly-consistent item was:
‘‘Volunteered to care for lonely old people.’’ An example
of an inconsistent item was: ‘‘Refused to talk with fellow
passengers on an organized trip.’’ An irrelevant item is
illustrated by the sentence: ‘‘Works as an accountant.’’
Sentences were presented in random order. For the ‘‘un-
friendly person,’’ the information presented was analogous.
Afterwards participants were presented with a surprise
recognition task for the information they had read about the
target people. The task presented participants with 45
statements in random order, of which 15 were ‘‘friendly’’
and 15 ‘‘unfriendly’’. The fifteen other statements were
new. Among them 5 items were consistent, 5 inconsistent
and 5 irrelevant. Participants were asked to assess the
extent to which each sentence describes the target person
on 6 points scale, from (1) ‘‘the sentence certainly did not
described target person,’’ to (6) ‘‘the sentence certainly
described target person.’’ The number of points assigned to
schema-consistent versus to schema-inconsistent and
irrelevant sentences correctly recognized was calculated
and used as an indicator of heuristic information process-
ing. Participants were then thanked, debriefed and
dismissed.
Results and discussion
Participants indicated how much they thought they were in
charge of the situation they reported. An independent t test
revealed that participants in the powerful condition felt
more in charge of the situation they recalled (M = 4.75;
SD 0.79) than participants in the powerless condition
(M = 2.88; SD 1.27), t(48) = 6.15, p\ .001, 95 % CI
[-2.47, -1.25]. The need for closure was equally dis-
tributed among conditions (t(48) = 0.99, p = .26).
No gender or age differences were found, therefore,
these variables were not considered in further analyses. We
found significant main effect of power (b = -2.15;
t(48) = 2.12; p = .04). Main effect of need for closure was
non-significant (b = .06; t(48) = 0.95; p = .35). To
examine the effects of power and processing style on
schema-consistent memory, we run regression analysis
with power as predictor and need for closure as moderator,
using the PROCESS program (Hayes 2013, model 1). The
experimental conditions were coded with -1 (powerless)
and 1 (power). We calculated the effect of power on the
schema-consistent memory for low and high values (-1
SD, ?1 SD) of the moderator. The interaction between
preference for heuristic processing, i.e., need for closure,
and power on schema-consistent recognition was signifi-
cant (R2 = .15; b = .12; p = .017, 95 % CI [0.02, 0.22]).
The interaction pattern is depicted in Fig. 1.
The analyses indicated that preference for heuristic
processing, operationalized as high need for closure, was
positively related to memory for schema-consistent infor-
mation for powerful participants (b = .15, p = .03, 95 %
CI [0.01, 0.28]) and non-significantly related to it among
powerless participants (b = -.09, p = .20, 95 % CI
[-0.24, 0.05]). Moreover, participants low in the need for
closure recognized significantly more schema-consistent
items in the powerless condition, as compared to the
powerful condition (t(48) = 2.88; p\ .01); while high
need for closure participants recognized more of these
items in the powerful, as compared to powerless, condition
(t(48) = 2.11; p = .04). The mood ratings did not differ
between high-power and low-power participants,
t(48) = 1.02, p = .39, 95 % CI [-0.94, 0.30].
To check the possibility that the valence of the induced
schema (‘‘friendly’’ vs. ‘‘unfriendly’’) influences the
obtained effects, we performed a three-way interaction
between valence, experimental condition (powerless vs.
power) and need for closure. The main effects of valence
(b = -1.08, p = .40, 95 % CI [-3.64; 1.46] as well as the
interaction (b = -.07, p = .37, 95 % CI [-2.36; 0.98])
were not significant.
The results of Study 1 supported our predictions.
Compared to lacking power, having power enhanced the
use of default information processing styles. Powerful
participants who preferred heuristic processing (those high
in the need for closure) recalled more schema-consistent
information, but those who preferred this processing style
less (those low in the need for closure) recalled less of this
type of information. In the low power condition, chronic
processing strategies did not influence memory. We did not
find the effect of power on mood, therefore, mood could
not explain the effects of power. Numerous researchers
have argued that power is expected to bias attention toward
positive information (i.e., rewards) and the powerless
Fig. 1 Regression lines showing memory for schema-consistent
items as a function of processing style and power
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toward negative information (i.e., potential punishments;
see Anderson and Berdahl 2002; Galinsky et al. 2014;
Gruenfeld et al. 1998; Keltner et al. 2003; Kunstman and
Maner 2011). However, we didn‘t find any differences in
overall heuristically-consistent recall for the target when
labeled as friendly versus unfriendly. This finding provides
evidence that the effects are not driven by heightened
attention to positive or negative information.
Study 2
Although the results of Study 1 provided support for the
hypothesis that power magnifies the use of default pro-
cessing styles, the study did not include a control condition,
and it was not clear that power was driving the effects. To
verify that the effects obtained in Study 1 derive from
having power, Study 2 included a control condition. In this
study, we used stereotyping as a manifestation of heuristic
information processing style (e.g., Chen and Chaiken
1999). The study tested the hypothesis that preferred pro-
cessing styles, operationalized as need for closure, will
guide the degree to which a target group is perceived in a
stereotypic way for participants in the powerful, compared
to control, condition.
Understanding the relationship between power and
stereotyping is important given the contradictory findings
in past research (e.g., Fiske 1993; Overbeck and Park 2001;
Weick and Guinote 2008). We expected that, in the pow-
erful (vs. control) condition, those participants who prefer
heuristic processing, as indexed by the high need for clo-
sure, would rely more on the stereotypes of the target
group. Participants who do not prefer heuristic processing
(low in need for closure) would rely on the stereotypes less.




A total of 52 students (35 females and 17 males;
Mage = 19.86, SD 1.41) participated in the study on a
voluntary basis. Participants were randomly assigned to the
powerful or control conditions. Ten participants did not
complete the dependent measure, as they received ques-
tionnaires with missing pages, thus their data were exclu-
ded from the analyses.
Materials and procedure
To identify participants’ default heuristic information
processing styles they completed five subscales of the Need
for Closure Scale (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). The
decisiveness subscale was not considered because it has
been recognised to measure the ability to impose closure
rather than the motivation for closure (Roets and Van Hiel
2007). A higher mean score (Cronbach’s a = .77,
M = 3.82, SD 0.64) indicates a higher preference for
heuristic processing. Similarly to Study 1, power was
manipulated by asking participants to report a past event in
which they had power over someone. Participants in the
control condition were asked to report what they did the day
before. Subsequently, participants completed the same
manipulation check as in Study 1, and they reported their
mood using 6-point scales, from (1) very bad to (6) very good.
The experimenter, who was unaware of hypotheses or
conditions, then introduced an ostensibly unrelated study
on person perception. Participants were given a list of 13
attributes related to the stereotype of Gypsies, as tested in a
previous study by Kofta and Narkiewicz-Jodko (2003). The
attributes were: unreliable, educated, lazy, friendly, com-
petent, moral, dishonest, family man, orderly, neat, intru-
sive, insolent, filthy. Participants were asked to assess on a
7 point scale (1—completely do not agree, 7—completely
agree) to what extent they agreed that typical Gypsies had
these characteristics. Positive attributes were reverse
coded. Averaged assessments of the attributes served as an
index of negative stereotypes (Cronbach’s a = .71;
M = 3.46; SD 0.60). Participants were subsequently
thanked, debriefed and dismissed.
Results and discussion
Participants indicated how much they thought they were in
charge of the situation they reported. To investigate whe-
ther the manipulation of power was successful, an inde-
pendent t test (power vs. control) was conducted on this
measure. As expected, participants in the powerful condi-
tion felt more in charge of the situation they recalled
(M = 4.74; SD 1.25) than participants in the control con-
dition (M = 3.78; SD 1.62), t(41) = 2.21; p = .03, 95 %
CI [-1.82, -0.08]. The need for closure was equally dis-
tributed among conditions (t(41) = 0.04, p = .69).
No gender or age differences were found, therefore,
these variables were not considered in further analyses. The
main effect of power was non-significant (b = -.04;
t(41) = 0.17; p = .68).The main effect of the need for
closure was significant (b = .34; t(41) = 2.14; p = .039).
To examine the joint effects of power and default pro-
cessing styles, we used the PROCESS program (Hayes
2013, model 1). As in Study 1, we run regression analysis
with power as predictor and need for closure as moderator.
The experimental conditions were coded with -1 (control)
and 1 (power). We calculated the effect of power on the
DV for low and high values (-1 SD, ?1 SD) of the
560 Motiv Emot (2016) 40:556–565
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moderator. Crucially, there was a significant interaction
between heuristic processing styles and power (R2 = .28;
b = .44, p = .01, 95 % CI [0.10, 0.77]). The interaction
can be seen in Fig. 2.
Simple slope analyses indicated that the preference for
heuristic processing (high need for closure) was positively
related to the stereotype index for powerful participants
(b = .92, p\ .001, 95 % CI [0.41, 1.43]) and non-signif-
icantly related to it among participants in the control
condition (b = .04, p = .86, 95 % CI [-0.39, 0.47]).
Moreover, participants low in the need for closure did not
differ in stereotyping in both conditions (t(41) = 1.85;
p = .07); while participants high in the need for closure
stereotyped more in the powerful, compared to the control
condition (t(41) = 2.27; p\ .01). Power did not affect
mood, t(41) = 0.42, p = .67. There is also no significant
correlation between mood and stereotyping (r = .06;
p = .71).
The results of Study 2 demonstrated once more that
power increases the use of preferred processing styles.
Power may lead to more or less stereotyping depending on
the individuals’ cognitive preferences, i.e., need for clo-
sure. Powerful participants, who preferred more heuristic
strategies (i.e., those high in the need for closure), relied
more on stereotypes compared to those who preferred
heuristic processing less (i.e., those low in the need for
closure). Again, we did not find the effect of power on
mood, therefore, mood could not explain these effects.
Study 3
Study 3 further tested the links between power and pro-
cessing styles in the domain of cognitive complexity. In the
present context, cognitive complexity refers to the capacity
to construe social behavior in multidimensional ways, a
capacity that requires less heuristic and more systematic
processing (Schroder et al. 1967). We hypothesized that,
for participants in the powerful condition, the higher their
need for closure, the less complex will be the categories
they construe to describe social targets. This should not be
the case for participants in the powerless condition.
Method
Participants
A total of 77 students (34 females and 43 males;
Mage = 22.12, SD 2.12) participated in the study on vol-
untary basis. Participants were randomly assigned to the
powerful and powerless conditions.
Materials and procedure
As in the previous studies, four subscales of the Need for
Closure Scale (Webster and Kruglanski 1994) were used to
identify participants’ default processing strategies. Due to
the low reliability (Cronbach’s a = .25), the Closed-
mindedness subscale2 was excluded from the analyses, and
the overall index was calculated using only three subscales
(Cronbach’s a = .76, M = 4.43, SD 0.73). A higher mean
score indicated a higher preference for heuristic processing.
Power was manipulated as it was in Study 1. Upon com-
pletion of the power manipulation, participants filled in the
manipulation check and reported their mood.
The experimenter, who was unaware of hypotheses or
conditions, then introduced a second, ostensibly unrelated,
study. Cognitive complexity was measured using an object
sorting task (Scott 1962), in which participants have to
place objects into meaningful categories. Participants were
asked to arrange a list of 28 nations into categories, which
they thought belonged together, and to indicate what they
thought the nations had in common. For example, from a
list of nations, Japan and England might be grouped
together as island nations. This procedure was continued
until the number of categories of each subject was
exhausted. Cognitive complexity is measured by the
number of distinctions made in the category system. The
greater the number of different attributes ascribed to the
objects, the higher the complexity score. The cognitive
complexity score was calculated with a formula suggested
Fig. 2 Regression lines showing the stereotype index as a function of
processing styles and power
2 The effects found in Studies 1 and 2 persisted even when omitting
the closed-mindedness subscale as in Study 3.
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by Scott (1962) and based on information theory.3 Partic-
ipants were subsequently thanked, debriefed and dismissed.
Results and discussion
An independent t test (power vs. powerless) indicated that
participants in the powerful condition felt more in charge
of the situation they recalled (M = 4.20; SD 1.30) than
participants in the powerless condition (M = 2.43; SD
1.28), t(74) = 5.89; p\ .001, 95 % CI [1.18, 2.36]. Thus,
the manipulation effectively induced power differences.
The need for closure was equally distributed among con-
ditions (t(74)\ 0.25, p = .80).
No gender or age differences were found, therefore,
these variables were not considered in further analyses.
Main effects of power (b = -.10; t(74) = 1.08; p = .28)
and need for closure (b = -.11; t(74) = .85; p = .40)
were non-significant. To examine the effects of power and
processing styles on the dependent variable, as in previous
studies we run regression analysis with power as predictor
and need for closure as moderator, using the PROCESS
program (Hayes 2013, model 1). The experimental condi-
tions were coded (-1 powerless/1 power). We calculated
the effect of power on the DV for low and high values (-1
SD, ?1 SD) of the moderator. The results of the analysis
revealed a significant interaction between preferred pro-
cessing styles (i.e., high vs. low need for closure) and
power on the cognitive complexity index (R2 = .08,
b = .26, p = .03, 95 % CI [0.02, 0.50]). The interaction is
illustrated in Fig. 3.
Because we were interested in the relationship between
preferred processing styles and cognitive complexity in the
powerful and powerless conditions separately, we per-
formed simple slope analyses. The analyses indicated that
the preference for heuristic processing, i.e. need for clo-
sure, was negatively related to cognitive complexity for
people in the powerful condition (b = -.36, p = .02,
95 % CI [-0.56, -0.06]) and unrelated to it for partici-
pants in the powerless condition (b = .16, p = .38, 95 %
CI [-0.20, 0.54]). Moreover, low need for closure did not
differentially affect the complexity of the categories con-
strued by participants in powerful and powerless condition
(t(74) = 1.45; p = .15). In contrast, participants high in
the need for closure used less complex categories in the
powerful condition, compared to the powerless condition
(t(74) = 2,43; p = .02). Power did not affect mood,
t(74)\ 0.30; p = .76.
The results of Study 3 supported the hypothesis. In the
powerful condition, those participants with a preference for
more heuristic processing expressed less complex social
structures, compared to those participants with a preference
for less heuristic processing. In the powerless condition, the
pattern of results was non-significant. Thus, we conclude
that power magnifies reliance on idiosyncratic processing
styles. Conversely, the lack of power may lead individuals
to refrain from using default processes. Again, we did not
find the effect of power on mood. Mood can not therefore
explain the abovementioned effects.
Study 1–3: Meta-analysis
Given that each study only differed in terms of the mate-
rials that were used, and that did other manipulations were
not included, we report the integrated results using a meta-
analysis of the three experiments (Cumming 2014). The
meta-analysis was conducted using Comprehensive Meta-
Analysis Software, on standardized regression coefficients
and its standard errors. The analysis was performed on
values of regression coefficients for the predictor (need for
closure), obtained from simple slope analysis of interaction
terms. So, in each study there were two separate predictor
coefficients (one for each experimental condition). In each
study we used different manifestations of heuristic pro-
cessing as dependent measures (total N = 165). Across the
three studies we have high power conditions, across two
studies low power conditions and in one a control condi-
tion. As we were mainly interested in the relationship
between the preference for heuristic processing (measured
via the need for closure) and its manifestation in the
powerful and powerless/control conditions separately, we
integrated the results for the high power conditions from
three studies and for low power conditions from two
studies. We did not include the results from the control
Fig. 3 Regression lines showing cognitive complexity as a function
of processing styles and power
3 Complexity = log2n - 1/nR(nilog2ni), where n is the total number
of countries, ni is the number that appears in a particular combination
of groups.
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condition to make the results more clear. Thus, we ana-
lyzed data from three studies, in two within-study sub-
groups (for the high power condition we included effects
from three studies; for low power condition we included
effects from two studies). We used the random-effects
model, as it is appropriate and more realistic in this case
(Schmidt et al. 2009). It assumes that the population means
estimated by the different studies are randomly chosen
from a superpopulation with standard deviation of s
(Cumming 2014).
The calculated effect size and confidence interval of the
heuristic processing manifestation is reported in Fig. 4.
The heterogeneity of effects sizes was not statistically
significant (high power: Q(2) = 3.72, p = .16,
I2 = 46.17 %; low power: Q(1) = 0.28, p = .60,
I2 = 0.00 %). As predicted, the analysis indicated that
preference for heuristic processing was positively and
significantly related to the heuristic processing expression
for participants from the powerful condition (b = .53, SE
.13, p\ .001, 95 % CI [0.22, 0.83]) and negatively but not
statistically significantly related to it among participants
from the powerless condition (b = -.21, SE .10, p\ .01,
95 % CI [-0.455, 0.028]). However, the difference
between these two conditions was highly significant, as
indicated by high the between-group variance component
Q(1) = 13.76, p\ .001.
General discussion
In three studies we found that across a variety of domains,
such as memory for schema-consistent information,
stereotyping, and cognitive complexity, situationally
induced power consistently increased reliance on default
information processing styles. Power increased the recog-
nition of schema consistent information, the use of
stereotypical information to form impressions, and
decreased the complexity of categorical representations,
but only for those participants who preferred to process
information in a heuristic way prior to attaining power. For
those who preferred to process information less heuristi-
cally and more systematically, power led to the opposite
effects. These effects were not present for the control and
powerless conditions. Together, these findings indicate that
power accentuates the ways individuals typically process
information.
A great deal of past research focused on the effects of
power on information processing, and in particular, whe-
ther power increases the reliance on stereotypes (for
reviews see Fiske and Berdahl 2007; Guinote 2013). Even
though evidence suggests that this is often the case, the
notion that power holders are cognitive misers, unmoti-
vated to be socially aware should not be generalized. For
example, it has been shown that power holders effectively
pursue goals (Guinote 2007), and can pay close attention to
subordinates when individuating information is relevant to
the attainment of their goals (Overbeck and Park 2001).
Guinote et al. (2012) explained the variability of power
related findings, arguing that power leads to flexibility and
situated responses, in line with accessible constructs,
including those that are temporarily or chronically acces-
sible (associated with dispositions). Expanding this notion
to the present context, the findings reported here show that,
similar to accessible declarative memory, accessible pro-
cedural memory regarding processing styles is also
amplified by power. That is, instead of leading to a par-
ticular way of processing information, power seems to
magnify the default, idiosyncratic processing strategies that
Fig. 4 Meta-analysis of three
current studies. Error bars
represent 95 % confidence
intervals
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individuals typically prefer. Therefore, consistent with past
research (Guinote et al. 2002), power increased interper-
sonal variability. Part of the inconsistencies found in past
research could derive from differences in the preferred
processing styles of power holders, triggered by chronic
response tendencies.
The present work focused on heuristic processing,
assessed through the need for closure (Kruglanski et al.
2009). One limitation of the present research is that it did
not include other information processing dimensions. For
example, systematic processing will be better measured via
need for cognition than low level of need for closure. We
would expect power to magnify reliance on other default
processing preferences, such as local or global, abstract or
concrete, fast or slow (Kozhevnikov et al. 2014). Power
holders’ sense of confidence and reliance on accessibility
should facilitate the use of any default procedural strate-
gies. These hypotheses await future research.
Future research also needs to consider how power and
dispositions interact with environmental inputs, such as
organizational goals, and with temporary states of the
perceiver, such as emotions. Given the greater cognitive
flexibility of power holders (Guinote 2007), we would
expect them to be able to adapt processing strategies to
salient goals or inner states. Research that simulated
organizational contexts supports these claims, showing that
power holders can be socially attentive or inattentive
depending on whether the organization was person-cen-
tered or product-centered (Overbeck and Park 2006).
Similarly, emotions shape the attentional strategies of
power holders (Ebenback and Keltner 1998). Dispositions
and context need to be considered in order to more fully
understand the implications of these findings, namely that
power enhances preferred information processing
strategies.
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